PNOC-EDC v. NLRC

Facts:

Danilo Mercado, an employee of the Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation, was dismissed on the grounds of serious acts of dishonesty and violation of company rules and regulations allegedly committed as follows:
1. Withdrew P1680.00 from company funds, appropriated P680.00 for personal use and paid the nipa supplier P1000.00.
2. Withdrew P28.66 as payment for the fabrication of rubber stamp but appropriated the P8.66 for personal use.
3. Absence without leave and without proper turn-over thus disrupting and delaying company work activities.
4. Vacation leave without prior leave.
Mercado filed a complaint against PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch. After considerations of position papers presented by both parties, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Mercado.

Issues:
1. Whether or not matters of employment of PNOC-EDC is within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
2. Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent, payment of his savings, 13th month pay, and payment of damages as well as attorney's fees.

Held:
The High Court affirmed the resolution of the respondent NLRC with modification: reducing moral damages to P10000 and exemplary damages to P5000.
1. The test whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation. Those created by special charter are subject to its provision while those created under General Corporation Law are not within its coverage. The PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under General Corporation Law, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Law.

2. PNOC-EDC's accusations are not supported by evidence. Loss of trust or breach of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, but such loss or breach must have some basis.

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

233 SCRA 163

Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan

Respondents:  SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena

Ponente:  J. Vitug

FACTS:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body.

In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety (90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioner’s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.

The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

 

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. 

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla. 

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. 

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition. 

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property. 

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. 

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. 

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. 

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

G.R. No. 103903.  September 11, 1992

Facts:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.  Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired.   Furthermore as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of a dejure officer.  Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

DRS. ELLEN AMBAS, JOANNE, et. al. vs. DRS. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA, et.al

G.R. No. 95244 September 4, 1991

DRS. ELLEN AMBAS, JOANNE, et. al. vs. DRS. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA, et.al  

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed and retained as resident trainee physicians by the DOH, assigned to the National Center for Mental Health (NCM) under the Residency Program of the government. By authority of the Secretary of Health, petitioners were issued temporary appointments as resident trainees.

However, in an undated confidential report, the NCMH Medical Training Officer, Dr. Efren Reyes, recommended the termination of petitioners' services because of poor academic performance and low ranking. The recommendation of the Training Officer for the termination of petitioners' services was based on the result of an evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee on 16 June 1989 of all NCMH resident trainees.

Petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Secretary of Health, which the latter referred to the CSC for appropriate action. In the same indorsement, the Secretary of Health confirmed the action of NCMH in terminating petitioners' services as resident trainees.

On 28 August 1989, the Board rendered a decision declaring petitioners' termination as not valid and ordered their reinstatement to their former positions. It was the opinion of the Board that the power to remove petitioners belongs to the appointing authority, namely, the Secretary of Health, and that, therefore, the NCMH through its representative has no power to remove the petitioners. The Secretary of Health later confirmed the removal on 17 August 1989.

ISSUE: Who has the authority to remove petitioners from their position?

RULING:

The NCMH had no power to terminate the trainees. Only the Secretary of Health, as the appointing authority, had the power to remove them from the service. Thus, the removal of petitioners by NCMH effective 1 July 1989 was not valid. But, the confirmation on 17 August 1989 made by the Secretary of Health of petitioners' termination had the force and effect of a valid removal, effective on the date such confirmation was made.

The Secretary of Health did not commit grave abuse of discretion in terminating petitioners from the service because the same was done with just cause, i.e., the petitioners' poor academic performance and low ranking in the evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee of NCMH. Under the circumstances, the valid removal of petitioners took effect only 17 August 1989, and, therefore, they are entitled to backwages from 1 July 1989 to 17 August 1989. 

FELICITO S. MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FELICITO S. MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

[G.R. Nos. 140199-200.  February 6, 2002]

Facts:

On September 16, 1992, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner,being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation, and his wife, Liwayway S. Tan, charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.

However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. 

On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

The Issue:

Whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.

Ruling:

Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan

Serana vs Sandiganbayan 

GR 162059, January 22, 2008 542 s 224 

Facts:

Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27. The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. 

Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held:

Yes. First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto) Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.